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Moral Responsibility Reconsidered: Integrating Chance, Choice and Constraint
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
48-54
Received:
4 February 2019
Accepted:
15 March 2019
Published:
9 April 2019
Abstract: Clarity is needed regarding moral responsibility, for theoretical and practical purposes, such as philosophical coherence and social regulation. In this article, I examine the notion of (individual) moral responsibility. I first dispense with a preliminary concern, that the notion of moral responsibility can be used in at least two distinct ways, which I argue are necessarily related and hence can be jointly addressed in this article. I then elaborate on what I consider to be the three key tenets of the proposed theoretical approach: chance, choice and constraint (which can hence be termed the 3Cs theory of responsibility); specifically, I consider chance as indeterminate (although calculable), whereas choice and constraint are determined by chance and by each other. I then integrate these tenets to form a rudimentary yet useful theory of (individual) moral responsibility, particularly referring to the iterative process of chance, choice and constraint. And then I apply this theory to three sufficiently dissimilar types of situations of ascending complexity: the responsibility of a democratically elected politician regarding his or her public communication, the responsibility of a person with psychosis regarding his or her psychosis-related behavior, and the responsibility of a parent regarding his or her dependent child’s upbringing. Finally, I summarize and attend to special and general implications of my conclusions, such as the importance of considering expected – rather than actual – impact of chance, choice and constraint, during moral deliberation for assignment of (individual) moral responsibility.
Abstract: Clarity is needed regarding moral responsibility, for theoretical and practical purposes, such as philosophical coherence and social regulation. In this article, I examine the notion of (individual) moral responsibility. I first dispense with a preliminary concern, that the notion of moral responsibility can be used in at least two distinct ways, w...
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Phenomenology and Ontology in the Lukácsian Concept of Labor
Manuel Alejandro Bonilla Bonilla
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
55-61
Received:
22 February 2019
Accepted:
8 April 2019
Published:
29 April 2019
Abstract: This article attempts to reassess the evaluation of one of the most crucial concepts in the philosophy of the hungarian philosopher Georgy Lukács, namely, the concept of labor. It discusses how, as a result of his own philosophical evolution, Lukács developed two different approaches in his investigation about the fundamental categories that comprise social reality. One approach -developed in his young years- discusses the social categories in relation with the historical development of the subjective consciousness, in other words, it deals with the relationship between ‘historical world’ and ‘human consciousness’. The philosophical evolution of the young Lukács made him understand that relationship according to the theoretical framework that Hegel developed in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. The second approach -developed in the marxist period of Lukács- assumes the social categories as ‘ontological concepts’ that explain the fundamental socio-economical elements of the meta-categorial system that is the human world. In particular, the article analyzes such duality of approaches in regards of the social category of labor. It shows how the interaction between these two approaches influences the discussion of the category of labor in the context of advanced capitalism, and how it affects the lukácsian understanding of social categories in general.
Abstract: This article attempts to reassess the evaluation of one of the most crucial concepts in the philosophy of the hungarian philosopher Georgy Lukács, namely, the concept of labor. It discusses how, as a result of his own philosophical evolution, Lukács developed two different approaches in his investigation about the fundamental categories that compri...
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Conceptions of the Future of Contemporary Civilization
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
62-65
Received:
25 March 2019
Accepted:
23 May 2019
Published:
11 June 2019
Abstract: The article discusses the future of European civilization on the basis of the theoretical views of O. Spengler (“cultural ages” and “fate”), A. Toynbee ("soul" and "Prometheus impulse"), N. Berdyaev (“barbarism”, “culture”, “civilization and religious transformation”), as well as certain representatives of postmodernism, who clearly indicate the crisis of the cultural values of our contemporaneity: J. Derrida, J. F. Lyotard, M. Foucault. There is made an attempt at formulating the dominant values of the western European civilization, namely the dominant values that have crystallized from Antiquity to modern dimensions of modern man such as autonomy, self-determination of the individual, and the idea of an active-creative beginning and the possibility for their transformation following the example of eastern cultures. Using the historical and analytical method, the study outlines critical global issues (ecological, anthropological, educational, etc.), which require serious reconsideration of the value priorities, such as the ideal of the transformation of nature. Special attention is paid to certain ideals and principles of man's attitude to nature and to themselves, coming from the Eastern cultural traditions. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that only the dialogue between the West culture and the East culture would be the salvation of our civilization.
Abstract: The article discusses the future of European civilization on the basis of the theoretical views of O. Spengler (“cultural ages” and “fate”), A. Toynbee ("soul" and "Prometheus impulse"), N. Berdyaev (“barbarism”, “culture”, “civilization and religious transformation”), as well as certain representatives of postmodernism, who clearly indicate the cr...
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Transcranial Theory of Mind: A New Revolution of Cognitive Science
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
66-71
Received:
17 April 2019
Accepted:
4 June 2019
Published:
17 June 2019
Abstract: In recent years, many scientists and philosophers have begun to believe that a new theoretic revolution is occurring in cognitive science. The revolution is the rise of theoretical models of “4E+S” cognition. “4E” denotes “embodied”, “embedded”, “enacted”, and “extended”; “S” denotes “situated”. Differentiating from the traditional computational theory or representational theory of cognition, this branch of new cognitive scientists and philosophers have begun to claim that cognition is embodied, embedded, enacted, extended and situated. All of these five theories agree that cognitive processes can proceed beyond the boundary of the brain. Thus we can synthesize them together as “transcranial cognition” or “transbrain cognition”. The questions are: Are there common characteristics of these five models? Can we integrate them together with a new model of cognition? Is the “4E+S” model a real Copernicus style revolution of cognitive science? This article analyzes these questions and provides the following answers: There is a common characteristics of these cognitive theories and it is the characteristics of transcranialness, i. e. cognition or mind can exist beyond brain; We can integrate them together as transcranial cognition; The new theory of cognition or mind is a new big extended theory of traditional cognitive science.
Abstract: In recent years, many scientists and philosophers have begun to believe that a new theoretic revolution is occurring in cognitive science. The revolution is the rise of theoretical models of “4E+S” cognition. “4E” denotes “embodied”, “embedded”, “enacted”, and “extended”; “S” denotes “situated”. Differentiating from the traditional computational th...
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Metaphysics of the Self, the Selfie as a Splinter of Modern Culture
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
72-81
Received:
13 April 2019
Accepted:
29 May 2019
Published:
19 June 2019
Abstract: Leszek Kołakowski once wrote such a sentence: “Metaphysics pushed out the door returns through the window”. These words of the Polish philosopher are still valid. Metaphysics did not die, although it went through intricate paths of criticism. It cannot be practised any more as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas or Hegel did. Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty introduced it to new paths. One thought seems obvious: metaphysics cannot be practised outside cultural, sociological and psychological contexts. In this paper, we seek metaphysical experience in contemporary culture. It is impossible to mention all the paths followed by culture and metaphysics related to it. Obviously, not every cultural phenomenon “generates metaphysics”, but the scale of the changes and redefinitions requires us to seek metaphysics in places where it has not been expected before. One of them is the omnipresent phenomenon of the so-called selfie. A photograph, taken with a smartphone, which documents both the person taking the photo and a trace of the environment they are in, is an attempt to create a new reality. “Creation” and reproduction are complicated cognitive processes. One may ask: is it not an attempt to formulate a “new metaphysics”? Can we provide its definition? Yes, we can. It is the metaphysics of oneself. An important inspiration for the presented reflections is a film by a renowned Polish director, Krzysztof Kieślowski – “Amator”. Descartes and Merleau-Ponty cannot be overlooked either. The conclusion I aim to reach is the following: a selfie is a rendering of a person, who is running away from himself and at the same time wants to find himself; who wants to notice, but does not notice; who wants to see, but does not see. This “pursuit” means both an escape from reason, concealed under a hastily conjured smile or seriousness.
Abstract: Leszek Kołakowski once wrote such a sentence: “Metaphysics pushed out the door returns through the window”. These words of the Polish philosopher are still valid. Metaphysics did not die, although it went through intricate paths of criticism. It cannot be practised any more as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas or Hegel did. Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levin...
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On Hui-neng’s Ontology That Regards Xin as the Origin
Li Bingquan,
Du Haixin,
Zhang Xudong
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
82-86
Received:
30 April 2019
Accepted:
19 June 2019
Published:
29 June 2019
Abstract: Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of Chinese Ch’an (Zen), traced the origin of the world where human beings exist, and made the explanation with unique Chinese cultural characteristics. He put forward the ontological thought of Xin (mind or heart), which can be reduced to the following two aspects. (1) Human Xin creates the world, which means “the world where human being lives and everything in it are created by human mind.” It does not mean that people’s Xin create the universe, but creates the world in which they live or the universe in their mind. In other word, the world where everyone lives and all things in it are created by his Xin. Because everyone’s Xin is unique, the world created by his Xin is particular. In other words, anyone has his own unique world. (2) “Human Xin is empty”. Hui-neng took “Xin is Buddha, Buddha is empty” and “all dharmas are empty” as the core and foundation of his thought, and attributed the Xin down to emptiness. Because he attributed the world's origin to the Xin that was originally empty, the world’s origin is able to be come down to emptiness at long last. It is the reason that Xin was empty, so that it is so large enough to hold (or accept) everything and produce everything. Because everything is empty, people do not have to pursue them, they are only external objects. Anyone who thinks in this way would not be troubled by external things. As the result, he keep his mind peaceful and ethereal.
Abstract: Hui-neng, the sixth patriarch of Chinese Ch’an (Zen), traced the origin of the world where human beings exist, and made the explanation with unique Chinese cultural characteristics. He put forward the ontological thought of Xin (mind or heart), which can be reduced to the following two aspects. (1) Human Xin creates the world, which means “the worl...
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The Reclassification of Technological Knowledge Based on the Modularity Theory
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
87-92
Received:
22 May 2019
Accepted:
25 June 2019
Published:
10 July 2019
Abstract: Technological knowledge refers to human body about design, manufacture and use of technological knowledge system needed for the Technological artifact. Carpenter, Ropohl, Vincenti, and Vries had classified the technological knowledge from different angles. With the development of technology, the content of the technological knowledge framework also continues to evolve, the classification of technological knowledge need to be reconsidered. From the perspective of modularity theory, the technological knowledge system can be decomposed into three main modules, and re-decompose the technological knowledge module into small modules. The dynamic integration between technological knowledge modules conducive to the flow of technological knowledge, and provide direct basis for further analysis and evaluation of technical education teaching.
Abstract: Technological knowledge refers to human body about design, manufacture and use of technological knowledge system needed for the Technological artifact. Carpenter, Ropohl, Vincenti, and Vries had classified the technological knowledge from different angles. With the development of technology, the content of the technological knowledge framework also...
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Mathematical Metaphysics: Modelling Determinism and Free-Will Along the Lines of Theological Compatibilism
Issue:
Volume 7, Issue 2, June 2019
Pages:
93-106
Received:
1 March 2019
Accepted:
28 April 2019
Published:
12 July 2019
Abstract: In this paper, an attempt is made to lay a systematic framework that helps answer a deeply perplexing philosophical question: “Can blind obedience to a set of immutable laws of nature pose a sufficient explanation for all phenomena in the world?” From the perspective of the human person, this question can be re-phrased as follows: “Do the events in a person’s life happen because they are pre-determined to do so, or is there some role for free-will to operate?” More succinctly stated, “Is the principle of determinism or the faculty for free-will responsible for the occurrence of an event?” An acceptable answer to these difficult questions must first require a better understanding of what precisely the terms determinism and free-will mean. In religion and mythology, the doctrine of determinism is embodied in an equivalent notion called destiny, which may be defined as a pre-ordained, inescapable, inevitable event. An accident, on the other hand, is a purely random and unpredictable event with neither intent nor design backing its occurrence. Religion holds that there are no such things as accidents and that every event is infused with divine purpose. Paradoxically, religion (Christianity, in particular) holds dear man’s capacity for free-will, which is in direct contradiction to the idea of destiny. How can free-will be truly free, if everything is already determined? Science too, is in a similar muddle on the problem of free-will, because it is still unsure whether the universe, the human mind included, runs on a deterministic or an indeterministic basis. After exploring the opinions gathered from diverse fragments of human knowledge (Philosophy, Physics, Neuroscience, Literature, Religion), two novel frameworks that are grounded in mathematical rigor are forwarded which fits both determinism and free-will into a single, indivisible philosophical paradigm.
Abstract: In this paper, an attempt is made to lay a systematic framework that helps answer a deeply perplexing philosophical question: “Can blind obedience to a set of immutable laws of nature pose a sufficient explanation for all phenomena in the world?” From the perspective of the human person, this question can be re-phrased as follows: “Do the events in...
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