Currently, the economy of China is demonstrating positive momentum. However, it also faces pressures stemming from structural adjustments and changes in the external environment. Ensuring sustainable development at the corporate level is crucial for maintaining overall economic stability and sustained growth within the nation. This paper utilizes A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 as a research sample and employs methods such as text analysis to measure managerial myopia, thereby investigating the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. The study finds a significant negative correlation between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities, with the level of financialization of the corporate playing a mediating role: managerial myopia can lead to an increase in the level of financialization of the corporate, thereby weakening corporate sustainable development capabilities. Furthermore, internal controls and managerial incentive pay weaken the negative relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. This paper also analyzes the degree to which managerial myopia weakens the sustainable development capabilities of enterprises with different property rights and different institutional investor shareholding ratios. It is found the detrimental impact of managerial myopia on the sustainable development capabilities of state-owned enterprises and corporate with lower institutional investor shareholding is more pronounced.
Published in | Science Innovation (Volume 12, Issue 6) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.si.20241206.16 |
Page(s) | 119-124 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Managerial Myopia, Internal Controls, Managerial Incentive Pay, Financialization, Corporate Sustainable Development Capabilities
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APA Style
Feng, N. (2024). Managerial Myopia and Corporate Sustainable Development Capabilities. Science Innovation, 12(6), 119-124. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20241206.16
ACS Style
Feng, N. Managerial Myopia and Corporate Sustainable Development Capabilities. Sci. Innov. 2024, 12(6), 119-124. doi: 10.11648/j.si.20241206.16
@article{10.11648/j.si.20241206.16, author = {Na Feng}, title = {Managerial Myopia and Corporate Sustainable Development Capabilities }, journal = {Science Innovation}, volume = {12}, number = {6}, pages = {119-124}, doi = {10.11648/j.si.20241206.16}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20241206.16}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.si.20241206.16}, abstract = {Currently, the economy of China is demonstrating positive momentum. However, it also faces pressures stemming from structural adjustments and changes in the external environment. Ensuring sustainable development at the corporate level is crucial for maintaining overall economic stability and sustained growth within the nation. This paper utilizes A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 as a research sample and employs methods such as text analysis to measure managerial myopia, thereby investigating the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. The study finds a significant negative correlation between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities, with the level of financialization of the corporate playing a mediating role: managerial myopia can lead to an increase in the level of financialization of the corporate, thereby weakening corporate sustainable development capabilities. Furthermore, internal controls and managerial incentive pay weaken the negative relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. This paper also analyzes the degree to which managerial myopia weakens the sustainable development capabilities of enterprises with different property rights and different institutional investor shareholding ratios. It is found the detrimental impact of managerial myopia on the sustainable development capabilities of state-owned enterprises and corporate with lower institutional investor shareholding is more pronounced. }, year = {2024} }
TY - JOUR T1 - Managerial Myopia and Corporate Sustainable Development Capabilities AU - Na Feng Y1 - 2024/11/21 PY - 2024 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20241206.16 DO - 10.11648/j.si.20241206.16 T2 - Science Innovation JF - Science Innovation JO - Science Innovation SP - 119 EP - 124 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2328-787X UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.si.20241206.16 AB - Currently, the economy of China is demonstrating positive momentum. However, it also faces pressures stemming from structural adjustments and changes in the external environment. Ensuring sustainable development at the corporate level is crucial for maintaining overall economic stability and sustained growth within the nation. This paper utilizes A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2022 as a research sample and employs methods such as text analysis to measure managerial myopia, thereby investigating the relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. The study finds a significant negative correlation between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities, with the level of financialization of the corporate playing a mediating role: managerial myopia can lead to an increase in the level of financialization of the corporate, thereby weakening corporate sustainable development capabilities. Furthermore, internal controls and managerial incentive pay weaken the negative relationship between managerial myopia and corporate sustainable development capabilities. This paper also analyzes the degree to which managerial myopia weakens the sustainable development capabilities of enterprises with different property rights and different institutional investor shareholding ratios. It is found the detrimental impact of managerial myopia on the sustainable development capabilities of state-owned enterprises and corporate with lower institutional investor shareholding is more pronounced. VL - 12 IS - 6 ER -