Williams puts forward and develops his theory of integrity on the basis of criticizing utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as too demanding to make enough room for personal projects. Instead, his integrity theory advocates that we should act out of commitments with which we deeply identify ourselves. In doing so, we express who we really are and make our life meaningful. If not so, our integrity would be violated and we may lose ourselves. Such a description of the self in moral life is criticized as solipsism for that it makes the relationship between one’s projects and himself only be regulated by himself. This paper aims to point out that such criticism is inappropriate. To show the inaccuracy of the criticism, the author will analyze the relationship between the self and others in two aspects. The first aspect is about the structure of formation of desires and others, and the second one is about the action responsibility and others. After analysis, in the first aspect of desires, the self needs others to form and stabilize desires, beliefs and motivations to cooperate with others. Others help the self to sustain the sense of reality to prevent the self from forming wishful thinking. As to action, others’ need for response is an important element in ascribing the self’s action responsibility. The self acquires self-conception, self-cognition and self-identity through the interaction with others. Thus, others play an essential role in Williams’ theory of integrity. Although there are some flaws in Williams’ integrity theory, to reexamine his theory is conducive to our understanding of moral life.
| Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 9, Issue 1) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16 |
| Page(s) | 66-71 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Williams, Integrity, Self, Authenticity, Action
| [1] | Williams, Bernard, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 10-11. |
| [2] | Williams, Bernard, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 105. |
| [3] | Xiangdong, Xu, Self, Others and Morality—An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2007, pp. 653. |
| [4] | Huijuan, Sun, Integrity, Moral Incapacity and Categorical Desires, Lanzhou Academic Journal, (5), 2014. |
| [5] | Taylor, Charles, The Ethics of Authenticity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991, pp. 28. |
| [6] |
Varga, Somogy and Charles Guignon, Authenticity, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = |
| [7] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 184. |
| [8] | Donghua, Wang, Internal Reasons and Reason Solipsism—Criticism on Williams’ Internalism, Morality and Civilization, (1), 2019. |
| [9] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 194. |
| [10] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 72. |
| [11] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 74. |
| [12] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 192. |
| [13] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 198. |
| [14] | Taylor, Gabriele and Raimond Gaita, Integrity, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 55, 1981. |
| [15] | Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 116. |
| [16] | Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973, pp. 103. |
| [17] | Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans., Gregor, Mary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 46. |
| [18] | Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 69. |
| [19] | Huijuan, Sun, Bernard Williams’ Criticism on Kantian Moral Responsibility, Morality and Civilization, (2), 2019. |
| [20] | Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 177. |
| [21] | Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 55. |
| [22] | Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 57. |
| [23] | Williams, Bernard, Shame and Necessity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 71. |
| [24] | Ashford, Elizabeth, Utilitarianism, Integrity and Partiality, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 97, No. 8, 2000, pp. 421-439. |
| [25] | Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 202. |
| [26] | Williams, Bernard, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, pp. 200. |
APA Style
Yong Tan. (2021). The Relationship Between the Self and Others in Williams’ Theory of Integrity. International Journal of Philosophy, 9(1), 66-71. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16
ACS Style
Yong Tan. The Relationship Between the Self and Others in Williams’ Theory of Integrity. Int. J. Philos. 2021, 9(1), 66-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16
AMA Style
Yong Tan. The Relationship Between the Self and Others in Williams’ Theory of Integrity. Int J Philos. 2021;9(1):66-71. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16,
author = {Yong Tan},
title = {The Relationship Between the Self and Others in Williams’ Theory of Integrity},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {9},
number = {1},
pages = {66-71},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20210901.16},
abstract = {Williams puts forward and develops his theory of integrity on the basis of criticizing utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as too demanding to make enough room for personal projects. Instead, his integrity theory advocates that we should act out of commitments with which we deeply identify ourselves. In doing so, we express who we really are and make our life meaningful. If not so, our integrity would be violated and we may lose ourselves. Such a description of the self in moral life is criticized as solipsism for that it makes the relationship between one’s projects and himself only be regulated by himself. This paper aims to point out that such criticism is inappropriate. To show the inaccuracy of the criticism, the author will analyze the relationship between the self and others in two aspects. The first aspect is about the structure of formation of desires and others, and the second one is about the action responsibility and others. After analysis, in the first aspect of desires, the self needs others to form and stabilize desires, beliefs and motivations to cooperate with others. Others help the self to sustain the sense of reality to prevent the self from forming wishful thinking. As to action, others’ need for response is an important element in ascribing the self’s action responsibility. The self acquires self-conception, self-cognition and self-identity through the interaction with others. Thus, others play an essential role in Williams’ theory of integrity. Although there are some flaws in Williams’ integrity theory, to reexamine his theory is conducive to our understanding of moral life.},
year = {2021}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - The Relationship Between the Self and Others in Williams’ Theory of Integrity AU - Yong Tan Y1 - 2021/03/26 PY - 2021 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 66 EP - 71 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20210901.16 AB - Williams puts forward and develops his theory of integrity on the basis of criticizing utilitarianism and Kantian ethics as too demanding to make enough room for personal projects. Instead, his integrity theory advocates that we should act out of commitments with which we deeply identify ourselves. In doing so, we express who we really are and make our life meaningful. If not so, our integrity would be violated and we may lose ourselves. Such a description of the self in moral life is criticized as solipsism for that it makes the relationship between one’s projects and himself only be regulated by himself. This paper aims to point out that such criticism is inappropriate. To show the inaccuracy of the criticism, the author will analyze the relationship between the self and others in two aspects. The first aspect is about the structure of formation of desires and others, and the second one is about the action responsibility and others. After analysis, in the first aspect of desires, the self needs others to form and stabilize desires, beliefs and motivations to cooperate with others. Others help the self to sustain the sense of reality to prevent the self from forming wishful thinking. As to action, others’ need for response is an important element in ascribing the self’s action responsibility. The self acquires self-conception, self-cognition and self-identity through the interaction with others. Thus, others play an essential role in Williams’ theory of integrity. Although there are some flaws in Williams’ integrity theory, to reexamine his theory is conducive to our understanding of moral life. VL - 9 IS - 1 ER -
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