From the perspective of actors' pursuit of rational self-interest, Gauthier's contractarianism links justice, rationality and morality, he attempts to deduce moral principles from non-moral premises by combining the method of contract theory, rational choice theory and game theory, and establish a just contract between rational actors to provide a plan of action for "How can I pursue a better life?". He tried to argue why rational actors chose to cooperate rather than from a normative point of view. He tried to prove that the actor's choice of cooperation is the result of rational choice because cooperation will improve the actor's situation. He believes that rational actors will choose to cooperate with people in a just and rational way, and rational actors will voluntarily abide by the contract and limit their behaviors in order to pursue a better social life. But his argument for cooperation lacks stability fails to fully prove why we should choose this mode of cooperation instead of that mode of cooperation and his argument for the rationality of cooperation is not convincing enough. He fails to demonstrate that collaboration is better than non-collaboration at all times, nor does he fully demonstrate that it is irrational to collaborate with actors other than constrained maximizers. Although his argument has some flaws and cannot convince all opponents, it provides us with a new answer to this question.
Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 8, Issue 4) |
DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13 |
Page(s) | 98-103 |
Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Gauthier, Contractarianism, Cooperation, Constrained Maximizer, Rational
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[2] | David Gauthier, “Reason to Be Moral?” Synthese Vol. 72 No. 1 Kurt Baier Festschrift Part I (Jul. 1987) pp. 5-27. |
[3] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 167. |
[4] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 80. |
[5] | Joseph Mendola,“Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement and Two Kinds of Rationality”, Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4, 1987. pp. 765-774. |
[6] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 7. |
[7] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 181-182. |
[8] | David Gauthier, “Twenty-Five On”, Ethics Vol. 123 No. 4 Symposium: David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement (July 2013) pp. 601-624. |
[9] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 8. |
[10] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 19. |
[11] | Peter Timmerman, Moral Contract Theory and Social Cognition, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2014, p. 10. |
[12] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 113. |
[13] | Robert C. Koons, “Gauthier and the Rationality of Justice”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 76, No. 1, 1994, pp. 1-26. |
[14] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 225-226. |
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[16] | Young-Ran Roh, “Is the Disposition of Constrained Maximization Chosen Rationally?”, Theory and Decision, Vol. 59, 2005, pp. 19-41. |
[17] | David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 17. |
[18] | Frank Forman, “Reviewed Work(s): Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier”,Public Choice, Vol. 56, No. 1, 1988, pp. 89-96. |
[19] | Johanna Thoma,“Bargaining and the impartiality of the social contract”,Philosophical Studies, Vol. 172, No. 12, 2015, pp. 3335-3355. |
[20] | Neill, J. “The Gauthier Contract: Applicable or Not?” Res Publica 23, 2017, pp. 1-22. |
[21] | Georgia Testa, “Gauthier and theCapacity for Morality”, Res Publica 9, 2003, pp. 223-242. |
[22] | David Gauthier and Robert Sugden, Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 3. |
APA Style
Deng Siyang. (2020). The Relationship Between Rational Cooperation and Constrained Maximizers. International Journal of Philosophy, 8(4), 98-103. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13
ACS Style
Deng Siyang. The Relationship Between Rational Cooperation and Constrained Maximizers. Int. J. Philos. 2020, 8(4), 98-103. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13
AMA Style
Deng Siyang. The Relationship Between Rational Cooperation and Constrained Maximizers. Int J Philos. 2020;8(4):98-103. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13
@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13, author = {Deng Siyang}, title = {The Relationship Between Rational Cooperation and Constrained Maximizers}, journal = {International Journal of Philosophy}, volume = {8}, number = {4}, pages = {98-103}, doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13}, url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13}, eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20200804.13}, abstract = {From the perspective of actors' pursuit of rational self-interest, Gauthier's contractarianism links justice, rationality and morality, he attempts to deduce moral principles from non-moral premises by combining the method of contract theory, rational choice theory and game theory, and establish a just contract between rational actors to provide a plan of action for "How can I pursue a better life?". He tried to argue why rational actors chose to cooperate rather than from a normative point of view. He tried to prove that the actor's choice of cooperation is the result of rational choice because cooperation will improve the actor's situation. He believes that rational actors will choose to cooperate with people in a just and rational way, and rational actors will voluntarily abide by the contract and limit their behaviors in order to pursue a better social life. But his argument for cooperation lacks stability fails to fully prove why we should choose this mode of cooperation instead of that mode of cooperation and his argument for the rationality of cooperation is not convincing enough. He fails to demonstrate that collaboration is better than non-collaboration at all times, nor does he fully demonstrate that it is irrational to collaborate with actors other than constrained maximizers. Although his argument has some flaws and cannot convince all opponents, it provides us with a new answer to this question.}, year = {2020} }
TY - JOUR T1 - The Relationship Between Rational Cooperation and Constrained Maximizers AU - Deng Siyang Y1 - 2020/12/28 PY - 2020 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 98 EP - 103 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200804.13 AB - From the perspective of actors' pursuit of rational self-interest, Gauthier's contractarianism links justice, rationality and morality, he attempts to deduce moral principles from non-moral premises by combining the method of contract theory, rational choice theory and game theory, and establish a just contract between rational actors to provide a plan of action for "How can I pursue a better life?". He tried to argue why rational actors chose to cooperate rather than from a normative point of view. He tried to prove that the actor's choice of cooperation is the result of rational choice because cooperation will improve the actor's situation. He believes that rational actors will choose to cooperate with people in a just and rational way, and rational actors will voluntarily abide by the contract and limit their behaviors in order to pursue a better social life. But his argument for cooperation lacks stability fails to fully prove why we should choose this mode of cooperation instead of that mode of cooperation and his argument for the rationality of cooperation is not convincing enough. He fails to demonstrate that collaboration is better than non-collaboration at all times, nor does he fully demonstrate that it is irrational to collaborate with actors other than constrained maximizers. Although his argument has some flaws and cannot convince all opponents, it provides us with a new answer to this question. VL - 8 IS - 4 ER -