This essay relates to proper names and how they can refer to individual persons, animals, or objects. An initial response to this question was the classical descriptivist theory. This theory was introduced by Frege and Russell, and presented the idea that we can think about specific things only indirectly via descriptive thoughts. Kripke developed a series of powerful arguments against descriptivism and proposed a casual theory for the referring function of proper names. The main idea in the causal approach is in passing on a name and its reference from one person to another. Another interesting approach to consider is predicativism, or the idea that proper names are just a special kind of common noun and that their semantic function is to designate properties of individuals. These approaches ─descriptive, causal, and predicative─. open a set of perspectives regarding a philosophical analysis of proper names, but offer no overarching bigger picture; consequently, there can be no secure consensus. Therefore, this paper proposes a phenomenological alternative that takes these useful elements and adds the idea that, in referring, the way an individual experiences the world is essential. The idea implies a two-way picture of reference-fixing, where the name and the referent are not necessarily a duality. The name refers to an object, but the object is presented as having that name as an aspect. If no individual object or person is presented to us as having a particular proper name as an aspect, the name is meaningless and does not refer.
| Published in | International Journal of Philosophy (Volume 8, Issue 3) |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13 |
| Page(s) | 75-81 |
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Analytical Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Referencing, Phenomenology
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APA Style
Arturo Leyva. (2020). Referencing Proper Names: Complementing the Analytic with the Phenomenological Approach. International Journal of Philosophy, 8(3), 75-81. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13
ACS Style
Arturo Leyva. Referencing Proper Names: Complementing the Analytic with the Phenomenological Approach. Int. J. Philos. 2020, 8(3), 75-81. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13
AMA Style
Arturo Leyva. Referencing Proper Names: Complementing the Analytic with the Phenomenological Approach. Int J Philos. 2020;8(3):75-81. doi: 10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13,
author = {Arturo Leyva},
title = {Referencing Proper Names: Complementing the Analytic with the Phenomenological Approach},
journal = {International Journal of Philosophy},
volume = {8},
number = {3},
pages = {75-81},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijp.20200803.13},
abstract = {This essay relates to proper names and how they can refer to individual persons, animals, or objects. An initial response to this question was the classical descriptivist theory. This theory was introduced by Frege and Russell, and presented the idea that we can think about specific things only indirectly via descriptive thoughts. Kripke developed a series of powerful arguments against descriptivism and proposed a casual theory for the referring function of proper names. The main idea in the causal approach is in passing on a name and its reference from one person to another. Another interesting approach to consider is predicativism, or the idea that proper names are just a special kind of common noun and that their semantic function is to designate properties of individuals. These approaches ─descriptive, causal, and predicative─. open a set of perspectives regarding a philosophical analysis of proper names, but offer no overarching bigger picture; consequently, there can be no secure consensus. Therefore, this paper proposes a phenomenological alternative that takes these useful elements and adds the idea that, in referring, the way an individual experiences the world is essential. The idea implies a two-way picture of reference-fixing, where the name and the referent are not necessarily a duality. The name refers to an object, but the object is presented as having that name as an aspect. If no individual object or person is presented to us as having a particular proper name as an aspect, the name is meaningless and does not refer.},
year = {2020}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Referencing Proper Names: Complementing the Analytic with the Phenomenological Approach AU - Arturo Leyva Y1 - 2020/08/10 PY - 2020 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13 DO - 10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13 T2 - International Journal of Philosophy JF - International Journal of Philosophy JO - International Journal of Philosophy SP - 75 EP - 81 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2330-7455 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijp.20200803.13 AB - This essay relates to proper names and how they can refer to individual persons, animals, or objects. An initial response to this question was the classical descriptivist theory. This theory was introduced by Frege and Russell, and presented the idea that we can think about specific things only indirectly via descriptive thoughts. Kripke developed a series of powerful arguments against descriptivism and proposed a casual theory for the referring function of proper names. The main idea in the causal approach is in passing on a name and its reference from one person to another. Another interesting approach to consider is predicativism, or the idea that proper names are just a special kind of common noun and that their semantic function is to designate properties of individuals. These approaches ─descriptive, causal, and predicative─. open a set of perspectives regarding a philosophical analysis of proper names, but offer no overarching bigger picture; consequently, there can be no secure consensus. Therefore, this paper proposes a phenomenological alternative that takes these useful elements and adds the idea that, in referring, the way an individual experiences the world is essential. The idea implies a two-way picture of reference-fixing, where the name and the referent are not necessarily a duality. The name refers to an object, but the object is presented as having that name as an aspect. If no individual object or person is presented to us as having a particular proper name as an aspect, the name is meaningless and does not refer. VL - 8 IS - 3 ER -
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