The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan

Reynier Limonta Montero

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan

Reynier Limonta Montero

Published in International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 10, Issue 5)

Received: 23 June 2022 Accepted: 5 September 2022 Published: 16 September 2022

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Abstract

The governance of co-operative banks since its creation has meant another side of the typical behavior of banks. The main aims of co-operative banks are substantially different in order to methods and practices. This premise could be understanding from ethical point of view but is not always understood in the field of finances & business and that can be established such as a kind of weakness from these entrepreneurships but this is the most outstanding characteristic of this figure. In fact, it make possible, their adaptation to several contexts including market niches impossible to access for large banks and financial institutions. In order to that conviction, this paper have as principal aim develop the theoretical propose on modulation of selective incentive in the governance of co-operative banks and its influence in the efficiency in the case of Participatory loan as an important tool in co-operative governance. The methodic used in this paper it starts from considering the theory of sets as a base and the Olsonian theorization of selective incentives as an element contained in them. The law as a system of values, rules and principles make easier the governance mechanisms around of participatory loans. Different ways of understand this phenomena make possible a plural vision of those; this is a distinctive point of this paper.

Published in	International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences (Volume 10, Issue 5)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
Page(s)	243-249
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Selective Incentives, Co-operative Banks, Efficiency, Participatory Loan

References

[1]	Mazzarol, Tim, et al. Developing a conceptual framework for the co-operative and mutual enterprise business model. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2018, Journal of Management & Organization, págs. 1-31.
[2]	Molins, Joaquim. La teoría de los grupos. Departamento de Economía, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. Barcelona: Working Paper 143, 1998. p. 39, Trabajo de Grado.
[3]	Olson, Mancur. La Lógica de la Acción colectiva. [aut. libro] Colectivo de Autores. [ed.] Ariel Editores. Diez Textos Básicos de Ciencia Política. Príncipe. Madrid: Editorial Ariel, 1985, Vol. Único, págs. 203-220.
[4]	Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Public Good and the Theory of groups. Príncipe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. pág. 1. Vol. Único.
[5]	Ostrom, Elinor. El Gobierno de los Bienes Comunes. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1994.
[6]	Limonta Montero, Reynier. La producción jurídica de los recursos de uso común. Bogotá: UniAcademia&Leyer, 2018.
[7]	Cazorla, Leonardo, López Godoy, Manuel y Lorenzana, Tomás. Análisis del coste financiero de los préstamos participativos desde la óptica de la lógica borrosa. 5, 2003, Cuadernos del CIMBAGE, Vol. I. 24.
[8]	Catalina, Javier. Spain Law is a good example of this conception. Que ventajas tiene financiarse con préstamos participativos? 204, Madrid: s.n., Marzo de 2004, Estrategia Financiera, Vol. I, págs. 48-53.
[9]	Chaddad, Fabio R.; Cook, Michael L. Understanding new cooperative models: an ownership–control rights typology. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, 2004, vol. 26, no 3, p. 348-360.
[10]	Maurer, Bill; Swartz, Lana; Sterling, Bruce. Paid: Tales of dongles, checks, and other money stuff. The MIT Press, 2017.
[11]	Business Council of Co-operatives and Mutuals (BCCM) (2016). 2016.
[12]	National Mutual Economy Report. Retrieved from www.bccm.coop.
[13]	CEPAL. http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/web_cepalstat/estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=e
[14]	Mendes de Paula, Germano. La inclusión financiera de las PyMES en Brasil: hechos estilizados, medición y problemática. CEPAL. [En línea] 2017. [Citado el: 28 de 1 de 2019. https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/events/files/sesion_4_-_inclusion_financiera_pymes_-_brazil.pdf.
[15]	Casado Raigón, José María y Pich Rossel, Valentín. La Financiación delas PyMES en la Unión Europea y España ante una situación de crisis económica y financiera. Bogotá: CILEA, 2013. Vol. I.
[16]	Raigón, José María Casado. Cuentas ambientales y actividad económica. Consejo General de Colegios de Economistas de España, 2004.
[17]	Harvey, Brian. Ethical banking: The case of the Co-operative bank. Journal of Business Ethics, 1995, vol. 14, no 12, p. 1005-1013.

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APA Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. (2022). The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 10(5), 243-249. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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ACS Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2022, 10(5), 243-249. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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AMA Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2022;10(5):243-249. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12,
  author = {Reynier Limonta Montero},
  title = {The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {10},
  number = {5},
  pages = {243-249},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  abstract = {The governance of co-operative banks since its creation has meant another side of the typical behavior of banks. The main aims of co-operative banks are substantially different in order to methods and practices. This premise could be understanding from ethical point of view but is not always understood in the field of finances & business and that can be established such as a kind of weakness from these entrepreneurships but this is the most outstanding characteristic of this figure. In fact, it make possible, their adaptation to several contexts including market niches impossible to access for large banks and financial institutions. In order to that conviction, this paper have as principal aim develop the theoretical propose on modulation of selective incentive in the governance of co-operative banks and its influence in the efficiency in the case of Participatory loan as an important tool in co-operative governance. The methodic used in this paper it starts from considering the theory of sets as a base and the Olsonian theorization of selective incentives as an element contained in them. The law as a system of values, rules and principles make easier the governance mechanisms around of participatory loans. Different ways of understand this phenomena make possible a plural vision of those; this is a distinctive point of this paper.},
 year = {2022}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan
AU  - Reynier Limonta Montero
Y1  - 2022/09/16
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
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PB  - Science Publishing Group
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UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
AB  - The governance of co-operative banks since its creation has meant another side of the typical behavior of banks. The main aims of co-operative banks are substantially different in order to methods and practices. This premise could be understanding from ethical point of view but is not always understood in the field of finances & business and that can be established such as a kind of weakness from these entrepreneurships but this is the most outstanding characteristic of this figure. In fact, it make possible, their adaptation to several contexts including market niches impossible to access for large banks and financial institutions. In order to that conviction, this paper have as principal aim develop the theoretical propose on modulation of selective incentive in the governance of co-operative banks and its influence in the efficiency in the case of Participatory loan as an important tool in co-operative governance. The methodic used in this paper it starts from considering the theory of sets as a base and the Olsonian theorization of selective incentives as an element contained in them. The law as a system of values, rules and principles make easier the governance mechanisms around of participatory loans. Different ways of understand this phenomena make possible a plural vision of those; this is a distinctive point of this paper.
VL  - 10
IS  - 5
ER  -

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Author Information

Reynier Limonta Montero

Law and Economic Department, School of Laws, Oriente University, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba

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APA Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. (2022). The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences, 10(5), 243-249. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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ACS Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. Int. J. Econ. Finance Manag. Sci. 2022, 10(5), 243-249. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

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AMA Style

Reynier Limonta Montero. The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan. Int J Econ Finance Manag Sci. 2022;10(5):243-249. doi: 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12,
  author = {Reynier Limonta Montero},
  title = {The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan},
  journal = {International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences},
  volume = {10},
  number = {5},
  pages = {243-249},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijefm.20221005.12},
  abstract = {The governance of co-operative banks since its creation has meant another side of the typical behavior of banks. The main aims of co-operative banks are substantially different in order to methods and practices. This premise could be understanding from ethical point of view but is not always understood in the field of finances & business and that can be established such as a kind of weakness from these entrepreneurships but this is the most outstanding characteristic of this figure. In fact, it make possible, their adaptation to several contexts including market niches impossible to access for large banks and financial institutions. In order to that conviction, this paper have as principal aim develop the theoretical propose on modulation of selective incentive in the governance of co-operative banks and its influence in the efficiency in the case of Participatory loan as an important tool in co-operative governance. The methodic used in this paper it starts from considering the theory of sets as a base and the Olsonian theorization of selective incentives as an element contained in them. The law as a system of values, rules and principles make easier the governance mechanisms around of participatory loans. Different ways of understand this phenomena make possible a plural vision of those; this is a distinctive point of this paper.},
 year = {2022}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Selective Incentives in the Governance of Co-operative Banks: The Specific Relationship Between Efficiency and Participatory Loan
AU  - Reynier Limonta Montero
Y1  - 2022/09/16
PY  - 2022
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
T2  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JF  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
JO  - International Journal of Economics, Finance and Management Sciences
SP  - 243
EP  - 249
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2326-9561
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijefm.20221005.12
AB  - The governance of co-operative banks since its creation has meant another side of the typical behavior of banks. The main aims of co-operative banks are substantially different in order to methods and practices. This premise could be understanding from ethical point of view but is not always understood in the field of finances & business and that can be established such as a kind of weakness from these entrepreneurships but this is the most outstanding characteristic of this figure. In fact, it make possible, their adaptation to several contexts including market niches impossible to access for large banks and financial institutions. In order to that conviction, this paper have as principal aim develop the theoretical propose on modulation of selective incentive in the governance of co-operative banks and its influence in the efficiency in the case of Participatory loan as an important tool in co-operative governance. The methodic used in this paper it starts from considering the theory of sets as a base and the Olsonian theorization of selective incentives as an element contained in them. The law as a system of values, rules and principles make easier the governance mechanisms around of participatory loans. Different ways of understand this phenomena make possible a plural vision of those; this is a distinctive point of this paper.
VL  - 10
IS  - 5
ER  -

Copy | Download