Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro; Asif Khan; Ahmed Arafa

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

| Peer-Reviewed

Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Ahmed Arafa

Published in International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 10, Issue 1)

Received: 9 December 2020 Accepted: 5 January 2021 Published: 18 January 2021

Views: Downloads:

Download PDF

Share This Article

Twitter
Linked In
Facebook

Abstract

An attempt is made by this study in order to determine whether AML is for protectionism or a leap forward. For this reason, the first part of this article sheds light on AMLs background along with aims and objectives of it while providing a precise glimpse into proposed merger under the AML. For this reason, the researcher took Coca Cola’s case in China. In addition to this, some concerns raised by scholars over the decision of China with regard to Coca Cola’s merger with Huiyuan are also addressed. The third part of this paper lays out a legal framework in order to create as well as implement AML, with special focus on the process of merger review. It is argued by the researcher that Coca Cola’s proposed merger was blocked by China under AML, which also drew world’s attention along with criticism. The reason is China flexed its antitrust practice muscles at the expense of this since a Coca Cola’s merger was blocked; while there is no doubt that it always attracts international business community. For decades China has been seen as the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. The role of protectionism is explained by part three while investigating concerns with reference to public interests under AML. In this section, underlying rationale to block merger of Coca Cola with Huiyuan is analyzed by proposing that how can improvement be made by China in the merger review process. China made us believe that the decision to block such merger was for lessening and protecting competition, however, clear guidelines are greatly required by enforcement agencies in order to follow as well as increase transparency in the processes of decision making, it would ultimately help china to make better plans for enterprises in the future while showing China as a greatly attractive and fertile ground in order to grow and expand. The paper is concluded in part four along suggesting the adoption of clear merger guidelines which would diminish all the concerns raised by legal scholars; such guidelines would help foreign firms in terms of merger with domestic enterprise in China in the future. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.

Published in	International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 10, Issue 1)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
Page(s)	34-39
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

China, AML, Protectionism, Competition, Merger

References

[1]	Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China [hereinafter AML], art. 10, available at http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-02/10/content_17254169.htm.
[2]	Xinzhu Z. & Vanessa Yanhua Z, (2009), Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 477, 478. The article reports that MOFCOM had "received" 58 merger notifications and reviewed and closed 46 of them.
[3]	Hannah C. L. Ha, et al. (2010) China's Anti-Monopoly Law Merger Control Regime - 10 Key Questions Answered (part 1), Mayer-Brown JSM (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public-docs/ClientUpdateChina.pdf.
[4]	Zhenguo W (2008), Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L. J. 73 (2008); Donald C. Clarke, CHINA: CREATING A LEGAL SYSTEM FOR A MARKET ECONOMY (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1097587.
[5]	Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
[6]	Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
[7]	Damien G (2009). The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation - The Process of 'Decentralized Globalization' of Antitrust and the Risk of Over-Regulation of Competitive Behavior, CHI. J. INT'L L. 189, 189 (2009).
[8]	Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Provisional Rules on the Implementation of Acquisition or Divestiture of Assets or Businesses for Concentrations of Business Operators, Notice No. 41, 2010 (July 5, 2010) [hereinafter Provisional Rules]
[9]	Susan B. F, (2009), The Evolution of Chinese Merger Notification Guidelines: A Work in Progress Integrating Global Consensus and Domestic Imperatives, 18 TULANE J. INT'T L. & COMP. L. 1, 49 (2009).
[10]	Mayer-Brown JSM, China's Anti-Monopoly Law Merger Control Regime - 10 Key Questions Answered (Part 1) (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/public-docs/Client-UpdateChina.pdf. Assuming a fairly constant stream of transactions, it is possible that the MOFCOM has reviewed nearly twice that number at the 2-year anniversary of the law.
[11]	Coke Offer for Huiyuan Triggers Widespread Worry for Famous Domestic Brand in China, XINHJA (Sept. 4, 2008), available at http://english.sina.com/business/2008/0904/184005.html [hereinafter Coke Offer Triggers Worry].
[12]	Fei D, Adrian E, Gregory K. Leonard, (2009), A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market - MOFCOM's Veto of the Coca-Cola & Huiyuan Deal, GCP - Global Competition Policy at 3 (Apr. 2009).
[13]	Stanley Lubman, ‘Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years’ (2000) 20 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 383 at 383–4.
[14]	L Nielson, A. (2018). "The Paradox Of Discretionary Competition Law". European Competition And Regulatory Law Review 2 (3): 156-165. doi: 10.21552/core/2018/3/4.
[15]	Fatima, S. (2012). "Competition Law In Pakistan: Brief History, Aspirations And Characteristics". Commonwealth Law Bulletin 38 (1): 43-62. doi: 10.1080/03050718.2012.646734.
[16]	Daudpota, F. (2013). "Anti-Money Laundering Law Of Pakistan An Overview". SSRN Electronic Journal 12 (3): 22-33. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.2368483.
[17]	Huang, Y. (2008). Pursuing the second best: The history, momentum, and remaining issues of China’s anti-monopoly law. Antitrust Law Journal, 75(1), 117–131.
[18]	Wang, X. (2002). The prospect of antimonopoly legislation in China. Washington University Global Studies Law Review, pp. 201–232.
[19]	Deborah Healey, ‘An Anti-monopoly Law for China: Weapon or Mirage?’ (2008) 16 Competition & Consumer Law Journal 220 at 225–7.
[20]	US Chamber of Commerce, Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law Enforcement, 2017 pp. 53–62.
[21]	Naween A. Mangi, Comment: Are Flourishing Cartels Reason Enough to Shut Down the Impotent MCA?, DAILY TIMES, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page=story_23-12-2004_pg5.
[22]	Xiaoye Wang, ‘The New Chinese Anti-monopoly Law: A Survey of a Work in Progress’ (2009) 54 Antitrust Bulletin 577 at 584–7.
[23]	Fei Deng and Cunzhen Huang, ‘A Five Year Review of Merger Enforcement in China’ [2013] (October) The Antitrust Source 1 at 18, available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/.
[24]	Ping Lin and Jingjing Zhao, ‘Merger Control Policy under China’s Anti-monopoly Law’ (2012) 41 Review of Industrial Organization 109 at 123–5.
[25]	Xinzhu Zhang and Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, ‘Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications’ (2010) 6 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 477 at 492–3.
[26]	H. Stephen Harris Jr et al., Antimonopoly Law and Practice in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 2–3.

Cite This Article

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Ahmed Arafa. (2021). Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 10(1), 34-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro; Asif Khan; Ahmed Arafa. Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2021, 10(1), 34-39. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Ahmed Arafa. Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2021;10(1):34-39. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15,
  author = {Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro and Asif Khan and Ahmed Arafa},
  title = {Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {34-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20211001.15},
  abstract = {An attempt is made by this study in order to determine whether AML is for protectionism or a leap forward. For this reason, the first part of this article sheds light on AMLs background along with aims and objectives of it while providing a precise glimpse into proposed merger under the AML. For this reason, the researcher took Coca Cola’s case in China. In addition to this, some concerns raised by scholars over the decision of China with regard to Coca Cola’s merger with Huiyuan are also addressed. The third part of this paper lays out a legal framework in order to create as well as implement AML, with special focus on the process of merger review. It is argued by the researcher that Coca Cola’s proposed merger was blocked by China under AML, which also drew world’s attention along with criticism. The reason is China flexed its antitrust practice muscles at the expense of this since a Coca Cola’s merger was blocked; while there is no doubt that it always attracts international business community. For decades China has been seen as the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. The role of protectionism is explained by part three while investigating concerns with reference to public interests under AML. In this section, underlying rationale to block merger of Coca Cola with Huiyuan is analyzed by proposing that how can improvement be made by China in the merger review process. China made us believe that the decision to block such merger was for lessening and protecting competition, however, clear guidelines are greatly required by enforcement agencies in order to follow as well as increase transparency in the processes of decision making, it would ultimately help china to make better plans for enterprises in the future while showing China as a greatly attractive and fertile ground in order to grow and expand. The paper is concluded in part four along suggesting the adoption of clear merger guidelines which would diminish all the concerns raised by legal scholars; such guidelines would help foreign firms in terms of merger with domestic enterprise in China in the future. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan
AU  - Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro
AU  - Asif Khan
AU  - Ahmed Arafa
Y1  - 2021/01/18
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 34
EP  - 39
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
AB  - An attempt is made by this study in order to determine whether AML is for protectionism or a leap forward. For this reason, the first part of this article sheds light on AMLs background along with aims and objectives of it while providing a precise glimpse into proposed merger under the AML. For this reason, the researcher took Coca Cola’s case in China. In addition to this, some concerns raised by scholars over the decision of China with regard to Coca Cola’s merger with Huiyuan are also addressed. The third part of this paper lays out a legal framework in order to create as well as implement AML, with special focus on the process of merger review. It is argued by the researcher that Coca Cola’s proposed merger was blocked by China under AML, which also drew world’s attention along with criticism. The reason is China flexed its antitrust practice muscles at the expense of this since a Coca Cola’s merger was blocked; while there is no doubt that it always attracts international business community. For decades China has been seen as the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. The role of protectionism is explained by part three while investigating concerns with reference to public interests under AML. In this section, underlying rationale to block merger of Coca Cola with Huiyuan is analyzed by proposing that how can improvement be made by China in the merger review process. China made us believe that the decision to block such merger was for lessening and protecting competition, however, clear guidelines are greatly required by enforcement agencies in order to follow as well as increase transparency in the processes of decision making, it would ultimately help china to make better plans for enterprises in the future while showing China as a greatly attractive and fertile ground in order to grow and expand. The paper is concluded in part four along suggesting the adoption of clear merger guidelines which would diminish all the concerns raised by legal scholars; such guidelines would help foreign firms in terms of merger with domestic enterprise in China in the future. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download

Author Information

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro

School of Law and Economic, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China
Asif Khan

School of Law and Economic, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China
Ahmed Arafa

School of Law and Economic, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou, China

Download PDF

Sections

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Ahmed Arafa. (2021). Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 10(1), 34-39. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro; Asif Khan; Ahmed Arafa. Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2021, 10(1), 34-39. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro, Asif Khan, Ahmed Arafa. Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2021;10(1):34-39. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15,
  author = {Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro and Asif Khan and Ahmed Arafa},
  title = {Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {10},
  number = {1},
  pages = {34-39},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20211001.15},
  abstract = {An attempt is made by this study in order to determine whether AML is for protectionism or a leap forward. For this reason, the first part of this article sheds light on AMLs background along with aims and objectives of it while providing a precise glimpse into proposed merger under the AML. For this reason, the researcher took Coca Cola’s case in China. In addition to this, some concerns raised by scholars over the decision of China with regard to Coca Cola’s merger with Huiyuan are also addressed. The third part of this paper lays out a legal framework in order to create as well as implement AML, with special focus on the process of merger review. It is argued by the researcher that Coca Cola’s proposed merger was blocked by China under AML, which also drew world’s attention along with criticism. The reason is China flexed its antitrust practice muscles at the expense of this since a Coca Cola’s merger was blocked; while there is no doubt that it always attracts international business community. For decades China has been seen as the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. The role of protectionism is explained by part three while investigating concerns with reference to public interests under AML. In this section, underlying rationale to block merger of Coca Cola with Huiyuan is analyzed by proposing that how can improvement be made by China in the merger review process. China made us believe that the decision to block such merger was for lessening and protecting competition, however, clear guidelines are greatly required by enforcement agencies in order to follow as well as increase transparency in the processes of decision making, it would ultimately help china to make better plans for enterprises in the future while showing China as a greatly attractive and fertile ground in order to grow and expand. The paper is concluded in part four along suggesting the adoption of clear merger guidelines which would diminish all the concerns raised by legal scholars; such guidelines would help foreign firms in terms of merger with domestic enterprise in China in the future. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.},
 year = {2021}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Anti-monopoly Law of China: A Case Study of Coca Cola’s Proposed Merger with Huiyuan
AU  - Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro
AU  - Asif Khan
AU  - Ahmed Arafa
Y1  - 2021/01/18
PY  - 2021
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 34
EP  - 39
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20211001.15
AB  - An attempt is made by this study in order to determine whether AML is for protectionism or a leap forward. For this reason, the first part of this article sheds light on AMLs background along with aims and objectives of it while providing a precise glimpse into proposed merger under the AML. For this reason, the researcher took Coca Cola’s case in China. In addition to this, some concerns raised by scholars over the decision of China with regard to Coca Cola’s merger with Huiyuan are also addressed. The third part of this paper lays out a legal framework in order to create as well as implement AML, with special focus on the process of merger review. It is argued by the researcher that Coca Cola’s proposed merger was blocked by China under AML, which also drew world’s attention along with criticism. The reason is China flexed its antitrust practice muscles at the expense of this since a Coca Cola’s merger was blocked; while there is no doubt that it always attracts international business community. For decades China has been seen as the land of opportunity and growth for foreign investors and only time will determine whether this decision signals a change in that policy. The role of protectionism is explained by part three while investigating concerns with reference to public interests under AML. In this section, underlying rationale to block merger of Coca Cola with Huiyuan is analyzed by proposing that how can improvement be made by China in the merger review process. China made us believe that the decision to block such merger was for lessening and protecting competition, however, clear guidelines are greatly required by enforcement agencies in order to follow as well as increase transparency in the processes of decision making, it would ultimately help china to make better plans for enterprises in the future while showing China as a greatly attractive and fertile ground in order to grow and expand. The paper is concluded in part four along suggesting the adoption of clear merger guidelines which would diminish all the concerns raised by legal scholars; such guidelines would help foreign firms in terms of merger with domestic enterprise in China in the future. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.
VL  - 10
IS  - 1
ER  -

Copy | Download