The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution

Zhai Yigang

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

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The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution

Zhai Yigang

Published in International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 8, Issue 6)

Received: 31 October 2019 Accepted: 28 November 2019 Published: 10 December 2019

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Abstract

The long-term and stable nature of insurance funds and the long-term demand of PPP projects for funds are naturally in line with each other. In the future, there is still great potential for insurance funds to deeply participate in PPP projects and serve the development of real economy. According to the current development rate, the available scale of insurance funds during the 13th five-year plan period will reach 20 trillion yuan, which not only provides sufficient sources of funds for insurance funds to participate in PPP projects. At the same time, it also creates a good condition for the insurance fund to conduct financing and service innovation in combination with the characteristics of PPP projects. The participation of insurance funds in PPP projects has become an important issue in the current development, but the earnings in the cooperation between the two sides need to be fully discussed and analyzed to avoid a series of problems caused by unreasonable distribution. Based on the current developing situation of insurance funds participating in PPP projects, this paper conducts two-party game analysis and three-party game analysis according to the classification of complete information condition and incomplete information condition. Through conditional assumption, model establishment and solution, the reasonable proportion of insurance enterprises, public sectors and project companies under different circumstances is obtained, and policy suggestions on promoting insurance funds to participate in PPP model are put forward.

Published in	International Journal of Business and Economics Research (Volume 8, Issue 6)
DOI	10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
Page(s)	452-457
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2019. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Insurance Fund, The PPP, Complete Information Game, Incomplete Information Game

References

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APA Style

Zhai Yigang. (2019). The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 8(6), 452-457. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

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ACS Style

Zhai Yigang. The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2019, 8(6), 452-457. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

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AMA Style

Zhai Yigang. The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2019;8(6):452-457. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

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@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25,
  author = {Zhai Yigang},
  title = {The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {8},
  number = {6},
  pages = {452-457},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20190806.25},
  abstract = {The long-term and stable nature of insurance funds and the long-term demand of PPP projects for funds are naturally in line with each other. In the future, there is still great potential for insurance funds to deeply participate in PPP projects and serve the development of real economy. According to the current development rate, the available scale of insurance funds during the 13th five-year plan period will reach 20 trillion yuan, which not only provides sufficient sources of funds for insurance funds to participate in PPP projects. At the same time, it also creates a good condition for the insurance fund to conduct financing and service innovation in combination with the characteristics of PPP projects. The participation of insurance funds in PPP projects has become an important issue in the current development, but the earnings in the cooperation between the two sides need to be fully discussed and analyzed to avoid a series of problems caused by unreasonable distribution. Based on the current developing situation of insurance funds participating in PPP projects, this paper conducts two-party game analysis and three-party game analysis according to the classification of complete information condition and incomplete information condition. Through conditional assumption, model establishment and solution, the reasonable proportion of insurance enterprises, public sectors and project companies under different circumstances is obtained, and policy suggestions on promoting insurance funds to participate in PPP model are put forward.},
 year = {2019}
}

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TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution
AU  - Zhai Yigang
Y1  - 2019/12/10
PY  - 2019
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 452
EP  - 457
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
AB  - The long-term and stable nature of insurance funds and the long-term demand of PPP projects for funds are naturally in line with each other. In the future, there is still great potential for insurance funds to deeply participate in PPP projects and serve the development of real economy. According to the current development rate, the available scale of insurance funds during the 13th five-year plan period will reach 20 trillion yuan, which not only provides sufficient sources of funds for insurance funds to participate in PPP projects. At the same time, it also creates a good condition for the insurance fund to conduct financing and service innovation in combination with the characteristics of PPP projects. The participation of insurance funds in PPP projects has become an important issue in the current development, but the earnings in the cooperation between the two sides need to be fully discussed and analyzed to avoid a series of problems caused by unreasonable distribution. Based on the current developing situation of insurance funds participating in PPP projects, this paper conducts two-party game analysis and three-party game analysis according to the classification of complete information condition and incomplete information condition. Through conditional assumption, model establishment and solution, the reasonable proportion of insurance enterprises, public sectors and project companies under different circumstances is obtained, and policy suggestions on promoting insurance funds to participate in PPP model are put forward.
VL  - 8
IS  - 6
ER  -

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Author Information

Zhai Yigang

School of Public Finance and Tax, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China

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Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Zhai Yigang. (2019). The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. International Journal of Business and Economics Research, 8(6), 452-457. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Zhai Yigang. The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. Int. J. Bus. Econ. Res. 2019, 8(6), 452-457. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Zhai Yigang. The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution. Int J Bus Econ Res. 2019;8(6):452-457. doi: 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25,
  author = {Zhai Yigang},
  title = {The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution},
  journal = {International Journal of Business and Economics Research},
  volume = {8},
  number = {6},
  pages = {452-457},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijber.20190806.25},
  abstract = {The long-term and stable nature of insurance funds and the long-term demand of PPP projects for funds are naturally in line with each other. In the future, there is still great potential for insurance funds to deeply participate in PPP projects and serve the development of real economy. According to the current development rate, the available scale of insurance funds during the 13th five-year plan period will reach 20 trillion yuan, which not only provides sufficient sources of funds for insurance funds to participate in PPP projects. At the same time, it also creates a good condition for the insurance fund to conduct financing and service innovation in combination with the characteristics of PPP projects. The participation of insurance funds in PPP projects has become an important issue in the current development, but the earnings in the cooperation between the two sides need to be fully discussed and analyzed to avoid a series of problems caused by unreasonable distribution. Based on the current developing situation of insurance funds participating in PPP projects, this paper conducts two-party game analysis and three-party game analysis according to the classification of complete information condition and incomplete information condition. Through conditional assumption, model establishment and solution, the reasonable proportion of insurance enterprises, public sectors and project companies under different circumstances is obtained, and policy suggestions on promoting insurance funds to participate in PPP model are put forward.},
 year = {2019}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - The Game Analysis of Insurance Funds to Participate in the PPP Earnings Distribution
AU  - Zhai Yigang
Y1  - 2019/12/10
PY  - 2019
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
DO  - 10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
T2  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JF  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
JO  - International Journal of Business and Economics Research
SP  - 452
EP  - 457
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2328-756X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijber.20190806.25
AB  - The long-term and stable nature of insurance funds and the long-term demand of PPP projects for funds are naturally in line with each other. In the future, there is still great potential for insurance funds to deeply participate in PPP projects and serve the development of real economy. According to the current development rate, the available scale of insurance funds during the 13th five-year plan period will reach 20 trillion yuan, which not only provides sufficient sources of funds for insurance funds to participate in PPP projects. At the same time, it also creates a good condition for the insurance fund to conduct financing and service innovation in combination with the characteristics of PPP projects. The participation of insurance funds in PPP projects has become an important issue in the current development, but the earnings in the cooperation between the two sides need to be fully discussed and analyzed to avoid a series of problems caused by unreasonable distribution. Based on the current developing situation of insurance funds participating in PPP projects, this paper conducts two-party game analysis and three-party game analysis according to the classification of complete information condition and incomplete information condition. Through conditional assumption, model establishment and solution, the reasonable proportion of insurance enterprises, public sectors and project companies under different circumstances is obtained, and policy suggestions on promoting insurance funds to participate in PPP model are put forward.
VL  - 8
IS  - 6
ER  -

Copy | Download