Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity

Sagarika Datta

doi:doi:10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

| Peer-Reviewed

Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity

Sagarika Datta

Published in Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 9, Issue 3)

Received: 2 June 2023 Accepted: 20 June 2023 Published: 6 July 2023

Views: Downloads:

Download PDF

Share This Article

Twitter
Linked In
Facebook

Abstract

Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.

Published in	Advances in Sciences and Humanities (Volume 9, Issue 3)
DOI	10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
Page(s)	90-96
Creative Commons	This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright	Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

de dicto, de re, Primitive Thisness, Transworld Identity, Haeccity

References

[1]	Adams R. M., ‘Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity’, Kim J et al (ed), Metaphysics: An Anthology, Blackwell, USA, 2012, pp109-211.
[2]	Fine K, ‘Essence and Modality’, Metaphysics: An Anthology, (ed) Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Z. Korman and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell Publishers, 2012.
[3]	Fine, K, Modality and Tense, Oxford University, Oxford 1964.
[4]	Frege, G, ‘On Sense and Reference’ Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gotlob Frege, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1960.
[5]	Grayling, A. C, An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, Harvester Press, Brighton 1982.
[6]	Grice H. P, Meaning, The Philosophical Review, Duke University Press, Durham, 1957.
[7]	Hallet L. G, Essentialism: A Wittgensteinian Critique, State University Press, New York 1991.
[8]	Plantinga A, The Nature of Necessity, Claredon Press, Oxford, 1974.
[9]	Munitz K. M, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, Pearson College, London, 1981.
[10]	Salmon N, Reference and Essence Prometheus Books, New York 1981.
[11]	Kim J et al (ed), Metaphysics: An Anthology, Blackwell, USA, 2012.
[12]	Kripke S, Naming and Necessity’, Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1980.
[13]	Leibnitz, W. Monadology, in G H R Parkinson (ed.) Leibnitz: Philosophical Writings, Everyman’s Library, Dent, 1973.
[14]	Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II (P. H. Nidditch, Ed.). Clarendon, Oxford, 1971.
[15]	Mill, J. S, A System of Logic, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1875.
[16]	Marcus R. B, Modalities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
[17]	Marcus R. B, ‘Essential Attribution’, The Journal of Philosophy Columbia, 1971.
[18]	Russell. B, “On Denoting” Munitz K. M Contemporary Analytic Philosophy,’ Pearson College, London, 1960.

Cite This Article

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Sagarika Datta. (2023). Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 9(3), 90-96. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2023, 9(3), 90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv Sci Humanit. 2023;9(3):90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11,
  author = {Sagarika Datta},
  title = {Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity},
  journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {90-96},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20230903.11},
  abstract = {Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.},
 year = {2023}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity
AU  - Sagarika Datta
Y1  - 2023/07/06
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
T2  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JF  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JO  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
SP  - 90
EP  - 96
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2472-0984
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
AB  - Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download

Author Information

Sagarika Datta

Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi, India

Download PDF

Sections

Plain Text BibTeX RIS

APA Style

Sagarika Datta. (2023). Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Advances in Sciences and Humanities, 9(3), 90-96. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

ACS Style

Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv. Sci. Humanit. 2023, 9(3), 90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

AMA Style

Sagarika Datta. Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Adv Sci Humanit. 2023;9(3):90-96. doi: 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11

Copy | Download

@article{10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11,
  author = {Sagarika Datta},
  title = {Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity},
  journal = {Advances in Sciences and Humanities},
  volume = {9},
  number = {3},
  pages = {90-96},
  doi = {10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
  url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11},
  eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ash.20230903.11},
  abstract = {Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.},
 year = {2023}
}

Copy | Download

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Adams on Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity
AU  - Sagarika Datta
Y1  - 2023/07/06
PY  - 2023
N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
DO  - 10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
T2  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JF  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
JO  - Advances in Sciences and Humanities
SP  - 90
EP  - 96
PB  - Science Publishing Group
SN  - 2472-0984
UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ash.20230903.11
AB  - Here I have focused on R M Adams’s view on individual identity and possible worlds coupled with a short entry on Dun Scotus’s notion of haecceity. This should enable one to see where the theories of Leibnitz, Kripke, Adams meet and diverge – taking one to a more comprehensive picture on the issue of individual essences. Adams explicitly avoids the term ‘individual essence’ – reserving it only for general essences. But his exposition can be read as suggesting an impressive way of reconciling the seemingly opposed approaches of Leibnitz and Kripke – the former admitting individuality to be strictly qualitative while the latter insisting it to be non-qualitative. Adams prefers to dub this individual identity as ‘Primitive thisness’ and clarifies that thisness being the property of being identical to a unique individual can thereby be defined independent of any reference to a property – which is by definition general and shareable. On the other hand suchness is a purely qualitative notion and does not fall back to any reference to a unique individual. Adams also points out that de re identity or transworld identity is primitive in the sense that it cannot fall back on a more fundamental property or relation. And the mark of an identity being primitive or non-derivative is its power to explain why two apparently two individuals are really one or the reverse.
VL  - 9
IS  - 3
ER  -

Copy | Download